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and thus beyond the reach of the Fourth Amendment. However, such
searches violate the Fourth Amendment when, under the totality of
circumstances, consent appears to be a product of coercion—that is, when
the consent was involuntary. In 1980, in Mendenhall v. United States, the
Supreme Court identified race as a relevant factor courts should consider
but failed to explain precisely why race was relevant. After decades of
mistreatment and state-sanctioned violence, distrust of law enforcement
was rampant in communities of color, and the Mendenhall Court correctly
intuited (but failed to describe) the coercive effect of this entrenched
distrust and corresponding fear when law enforcement sought consent to
search from a person of color. These sentiments have persisted—even as
police forces have become more diverse and misconduct has, by many
accounts, decreased—and recent developments in video recording
technology and social media have created immediate and pervasive social
awareness of new incidents of police violence against persons of color and
further reinforced this inherited distrust. Yet, since Mendenhall, the
Supreme Court has ignored race in its consent search cases, and lower
courts have followed suit. This is an inexcusable and worrisome
omission—race should be one of the central factors relevant to determining
whether, under the totality of the circumstances, consent to search was
impermissibly coerced.
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In a society based on law, the concept of agreement and consent should
be given a weight and dignity of its own.
—Justice Anthony M. Kennedy†

And when you think about why, in the African American community at
least, there’s a lot of pain around what happened here, I think it’s
important to recognize that the African American community is looking
at this issue through a set of experiences and a history that doesn’t go
away . . . . [T]hose sets of experiences inform how the African
American community interprets what happened one night in Florida.
And it’s inescapable for people to bring those experiences to bear. The
African American community is also knowledgeable that there is a
history of racial disparities in the application of our criminal laws—
everything from the death penalty to enforcement of our drug laws.
—President Barack Obama‡

INTRODUCTION
A man is walking home alone late one evening. A police officer
approaches him and, relying on nothing more than a hunch, asks the man if

†

United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207 (2002) (majority opinion).
Remarks
by
the
President
on
Trayvon
Martin
(July
19,
2013),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/19/remarks-president-trayvon-martin
[https://perma.cc/3MDR-2C32].
‡
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he can search his backpack, which unbeknownst to the officer, contains a
small amount of marijuana. Knowing that his bag contains contraband, why
would the man consent to the search of his bag? The most obvious
explanation is that he likely does not know that he has a constitutional right
to refuse consent in such an encounter and that the police officer, lacking
articulable reasonable suspicion, cannot lawfully compel his compliance.
Regardless of whether he knows his rights, it is nonetheless natural to
assume that such a request “originating from an authority” is “backed by
force.”1 Even if an officer has not expressly threatened physical force, the
perceived risk of consequences for noncompliance can coerce consent from
someone legally entitled to and preferring to refuse. Thus, while “[i]t may
be rational to comply” with such a request to search, “that doesn’t make it
voluntary.”2
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, the Supreme Court held that a
warrantless search pursuant to consent—such as the hypothetical one
above—is valid if the consent was voluntarily granted and invalid if it was
the product of coercion.3 The “totality of the circumstances” are to be
considered in making this determination, with attention paid to both “subtly
coercive” police conduct and the “vulnerable subjective state of the person
who consents.”4 The Court explicitly identified “the youth of the accused,
his lack of education, his low intelligence, the lack of any advice to the
accused of his constitutional rights, the length of detention, the repeated
and prolonged nature of the questioning, and the use of physical
punishment” as examples of such relevant factors.5 Yet, turning back to the
hypothetical above, does the race of the “consenting” man have a place in
this totality test?
In 1980, United States v. Mendenhall suggested that it does—the
Supreme Court acknowledged that the defendant may have felt “unusually
threatened” because she was “a female and a Negro” and the police were
white men.6 But the Court offered no explanation of why race was relevant
to this inquiry and subsequently afforded it little weight in upholding the

1

Janice Nadler & J.D. Trout, The Language of Consent in Police Encounters, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND LAW 332 (Peter M. Tiersma & Lawrence M. Solan eds., 2012); see
also id. at 337 (“Given the nature of police authority and the context of the citizen–police encounter, it
is highly likely that police requests to search are often interpreted as commands to permit the search to
take place.”).
2
Id. at 332 (emphasis added).
3
412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
4
Id. at 227, 229.
5
Id. at 226 (citations omitted).
6
446 U.S. 544, 558 (1980).
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validity of the search.7 And in the years since, the Court has at least twice
reviewed the validity of a consent search involving a person of color and in
each case entirely omitted any mention of race.8 Rather, Mendenhall’s
recognition of the salience of race has been relegated to offhand footnotes,9
and lower courts have likewise all but ignored race when they walk through
the Schneckloth analysis.10 These omissions are consistent with what
scholars label the law’s “systematic denial of the reality of the social
meaning underlying” citizen–police encounters,11 particularly between
persons of color and police.
This Note argues that Mendenhall’s nod to race—while lacking in
rhetorical and analytical vigor—was undeniably correct and that the
subsequent colorblind gloss on the consent search doctrine was and
remains misguided, unnecessary, and inconsistent with Schneckloth’s
command that all relevant circumstances be considered. Accordingly, the
doctrine requires (as do concerns for equity and fairness) that courts
explicitly consider race when conducting the totality of circumstances
inquiry. For generations, communities of color have been subject to
systemic and at times violent oppression at the hands of law enforcement,
manifested through complicity with Jim Crow institutions and their modern
progeny, as well as individual acts of targeted depravity.12 As a result, there
7

Id.
See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2001); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). In
their Bostick dissent, Justices Thurgood Marshall, John Paul Stevens, and Harry Blackmun observe that,
despite the constitutional bar from doing so, law enforcement officers continue to use race as a factor in
determining which passengers to (supposedly) randomly approach during bus sweeps. See 501 U.S. at
441 n.1, 450 n.4 (Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun, J.J., dissenting). The dissent offers a scathing
critique of the majority opinion yet does not identify its failure to consider race in evaluating
coerciveness as one of its flaws.
9
See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 517 n.2 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The plurality
instead points to several other differences between this case and Mendenhall: the officers retained
Royer’s ticket and identification, momentarily took possession of Royer’s luggage, and did not advise
him that he could decline to be searched [460 U.S.] at 504, n. 9. Like Justice Powell, I considered the
question whether a threshold seizure had taken place in Mendenhall to be ‘extremely close.’ 446 U.S.,
at 560 (Powell, J., concurring in part). Thus, notwithstanding the facts that, unlike the suspect in
Mendenhall, Royer was a well-educated, adult, Caucasian male, cf. [460 U.S.] at 558 (‘that the
respondent, a female and a Negro, may have felt unusually threatened by the officers, who were white
males,’ is ‘not irrelevant’ to the degree of coercion), the differences noted by the plurality lead me to
agree that a reasonable person in Royer’s circumstances would not have felt free to walk away.”).
10
See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.10(b) (4th ed. 2016) (describing
factors bearing on validity of consent and not mentioning race); Brian A. Sutherland, Note, Whether
Consent to Search Was Given Voluntarily: A Statistical Analysis of Factors that Predict the
Suppression Rulings of the Federal District Courts, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2192 (2006) (collecting consent
search cases and identifying prominent factors, and making no mention of race).
11
Nadler & Trout, supra note 1, at 326; see id. at 333–34.
12
Katie Nodjimbadem, The Long, Painful History of Police Brutality in the U.S.,
SMITHSONIAN.COM (July 27, 2017), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/long8
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is well-documented heightened distrust of law enforcement in communities
of color around the country.13 For some, this distrust manifests into “fear of
how an officer with a gun will react to them.”14 For others, distrust might
not induce fear but rather a measured apprehension, a perception of
heightened risk of possible harm. Whether operating through fear or
calculated risk, such pervasive distrust has influenced the manner in which
persons of color relate to and engage with law enforcement. To be sure, in
some instances, this distrust manifests into active resistance of police
commands or flight to avoid an encounter entirely.15 However, it can also
have the opposite, disarming effect—inducing compliance with police
requests that, absent the coercive effect of the perceived danger, would
otherwise be refused. This phenomenon is the focus of this Note.
Recognizing that courts have increasingly framed the coercion inquiry
as whether it was objectively reasonable for an officer to believe that
consent was voluntary given the totality of the circumstances known to the
officer at the time of the request, heightened distrust may only be
considered if a reasonable officer in the position of the arresting officer
would have known about it. While many individually held and communitywide subjective beliefs would be excluded under this framing, law
enforcement has long been aware of widely held beliefs in communities of
color regarding unjustified use of force, and that awareness has only grown
with the proliferation of mobile video recording technology and social
media.
Therefore, meaningful consideration of race would likely lead courts
to invalidate as coercive some, but by no means all, consent searches that
would otherwise be upheld as voluntary. While the Supreme Court may

painful-history-police-brutality-in-the-us-180964098 [https://perma.cc/V526-NU8M]. The deaths of
Laquan McDonald, Tamir Rice, and Philando Castile serve as prominent modern examples, while the
beatings of John Smith in Newark in 1967 and of Rodney King in Los Angeles in 1991, and the regular
employment of fire hoses and police dogs against protestors throughout the Civil Rights Era likewise
were and remain infamous. See, e.g., Anatomy of a Race Riot, TIME (July 21, 1967) (cover displaying
photo
of
John
Smith), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/
0,9263,7601670721,00.html [https://perma.cc/Y2SA-UBCQ]; Seth Mydans, Tape of Beating by Police
Revives Charges of Racism, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/07/us/tapeof-beating-by-police-revives-charges-of-racism.html [https://perma.cc/7D24-3F56]; Foster Hailey,
Dogs and Hoses Repulse Negroes at Birmingham, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 1963),
https://partners.nytimes.com/library/national/race/050463race-ra.html [https://perma.cc/YYD4-8TQL].
13
See infra Part II.
14
Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
15
See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 132 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(observing that an innocent person in a minority community very well may believe that “contact with
the police can itself be dangerous”).
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overstate the social and legal value of consent searches,16 they are arguably
efficient, they (at least in theory) provide opportunities for collaborative
citizen–police engagement, and they do uncover evidence linked to
criminal conduct; thus, it may be undesirable to aggressively discourage or
functionally prohibit utilization of this tactic. Because there is little
question that consent searches are here to stay,17 this Note merely suggests
that consistent judicial recognition of the psychological effects of longestablished, persistent, and widely publicized dynamics between police and
communities of color—a recognition implicit in Mendenhall but since
ignored—could remedy at least some instances of gross injustice without
requiring drastic, controversial, or expensive reform.18
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I outlines the contours of
current consent search doctrine and the test for determining whether
consent was coerced. Next, Part II discusses how voluminous, nationwide
coverage of alleged police misconduct in communities of color materializes
as coercive distrust and fear. Part III argues that, because of the heightened
distrust, race is clearly a proper factor to be considered in determining
whether a person of color was coerced into consenting to search. Part IV
then discusses theoretical and practical concerns that arise from this
analytic framework.
16

For examples of the Court’s praise of consent searches, see Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct.
1126, 1137 (2014) (“[The warrant] requirement may also impose an unmerited burden on the person
who consents to an immediate search, since the warrant application procedure entails delay.”); id.
(suggesting that denying certain third-party occupants the right to consent to search “would also show
disrespect for [their] independence”); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 116 (2006) (noting the
importance of third-party consent to respect the third party’s “legitimate self-interest in siding with the
police to deflect suspicion raised by sharing quarters with a criminal”); United States v. Drayton,
536 U.S. 194, 207 (2002) (suggesting that consent searches “reinforce[] the rule of law”); Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 243 (1973) (“[T]he community has a real interest in encouraging consent,
for the resulting search may yield necessary evidence for the solution and prosecution of crime,
evidence that may insure that a wholly innocent person is not wrongly charged with a criminal
offense.”). For a sample of the scholarly criticism of this approach, see Alafair S. Burke, Consent
Searches and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 67 FLA. L. REV. 509, 543–49 (2015) (suggesting that
the Court has overvalued the utility of consent searches for law enforcement); Nadler & Trout, supra
note 1, at 338–39 (arguing that the Court has underestimated the costs of such searches, by identifying
the dignitary harms suffered by innocent persons searched involuntarily and the systemic legitimacy
costs to law enforcement and the legal system resulting from such searches).
17
See Note, The Fourth Amendment and Antidilution: Confronting the Overlooked Function of the
Consent Search Doctrine, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2187, 2187 (2006) (“While it remains unclear exactly
how useful or essential consent searches are to law enforcement, at least one thing is certain: the
Supreme Court has been unabashedly enthusiastic about their use.” (footnotes omitted)).
18
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Court next
states that its unwillingness to regard petitioner’s evidence as sufficient is based in part on the fear that
recognition of McCleskey’s claim would open the door to widespread challenges to all aspects of
criminal sentencing. Taken on its face, such a statement seems to suggest a fear of too much justice.”
(internal citations omitted)).
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I.   CONSENT SEARCHES AND THE COERCIVENESS INQUIRY
On its face, the Fourth Amendment provides considerable protections
against intrusions by the state: “The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”19 The “essential purpose[s]” of these
guarantees are “to shield the citizen from unwarranted intrusions into his
privacy”20 and to protect the citizen’s “conscience and human dignity.”21
Under the Fourth Amendment, a search has not occurred “unless ‘the
[private] individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the
object of the challenged search,’ and ‘society is willing to recognize that
expectation as reasonable.’”22 Often, deciding whether law enforcement
conduct constituted a search is a dispositive question, as Fourth
Amendment protections do not apply if the conduct in question was not a
“search” as contemplated by the Fourth Amendment.23
Contrary to the Fourth Amendment’s seemingly broad protections,
“certain categories of permissible warrantless searches have long been
recognized” as exceptions to those protections and “[c]onsent searches
occupy one of these categories.”24 A consent search occurs when an
individual grants a law enforcement officer permission to search her person
or property—the government has the burden of “demonstrat[ing] that [any
such] consent was in fact voluntarily given”25 In determining the validity of
consent, courts consider two interrelated but conceptually distinct
questions.26 First, the court asks whether the defendant indicated
agreement,27 either implied or express,28 to the search. Second, the court

19

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958); see also Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 589
(1974) (noting that privacy interests, not property interests, motivate the Fourth Amendment).
21
Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965).
22
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211
(1986)).
23
Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and
Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 122 (2002).
24
Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1132 (2014); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (“[O]ne of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both
a warrant and probable cause is a search . . . conducted pursuant to consent.”).
25
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248.
26
While this Note focuses on the second inquiry, the role of race and heightened distrust of law
enforcement in properly addressing the first question is a worthwhile topic for future scholarship.
27
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548–49 (1968) (noting that mere “acquiescence to a
claim of lawful authority” is not sufficient indicium of agreement to constitute consent).
28
See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185 (2016) (“[C]onsent . . . may be fairly
inferred from context.”).
20
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asks whether that agreement was voluntary or coerced.29 In the defining
consent search case Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, the Supreme Court
acknowledged the argument that “‘consent’ is a ‘waiver’ of a person’s
rights” under the Fourth Amendment,30 but it held that the standard
requirements for valid waiver applied elsewhere in the law—i.e., that a
waiver be “knowing” and “intelligent”—do not apply in the consent search
context.31 Accordingly, a person need not know that she has a right to
refuse consent to relinquish the right—in most other contexts, such
ignorance would preclude any waiver of the right in question. Instead,
consent was involuntary if “a defendant’s will was overborne” and her
consent was coerced; in ferreting out such coercion, a court is to consider
“the totality of all the surrounding circumstances,” including “the
characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.”32 Implicit
in this doctrine is the recognition that while citizens have a right to refuse
policing, they sacrifice that and other rights if they fail to actively resist.33
The rationale justifying the consent exception and the frame through
which courts should conduct the Schneckloth analysis are hardly settled.
Some suggest that “[t]he act of consenting (or, at least, the reasonable
expression of consent) is itself an act that justifies” any subsequent search
as “legitimate,” and thus reasonable and permissible.34 Under this
paradigm, the fact that a police officer was given permission to conduct a
search would generally end the inquiry because reasonableness is measured
from the officer’s perspective—and from that perspective, it is always
reasonable to conduct a search when someone granted you permission to do
so.35 Only when a police officer unreasonably interprets a citizen’s conduct
29

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227.
Id. at 235.
31
Id. at 241; see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464–65 (1938) (articulating the waiver
standard for the Sixth Amendment right to counsel). For a discussion of how Fourth Amendment
consent to search differs from knowing and voluntary waiver under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments,
see David S. Kaplan & Lisa Dixon, Coerced Waiver and Coerced Consent, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 941,
942–54 (1997).
32
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226.
33
See Eric J. Miller, Encountering Resistance: Contesting Policing and Procedural Justice,
2016 U CHI. LEGAL F. 295, 296.
34
Daniel R. Williams, Misplaced Angst: Another Look at Consent-Search Jurisprudence, 82 IND.
L.J. 69, 76 (2007); see also John B. MacDonald, Case Comment, Constitutional Law: Voluntary
Consent to Search Pursuant to an Unlawful Arrest, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 273, 274 (1975) (“One
contention is that a search conducted with the consent of the individual being searched is inherently
reasonable.” (footnote omitted)).
35
See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250–51 (1991) (“[W]e have long approved consensual
searches because it is no doubt reasonable for the police to conduct a search once they have been
permitted to do so.”). This framing tracks closely with the objective prong of the reasonable
expectations of privacy analysis established in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Exploring
30
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as a grant of consent would the subsequent search be impermissible under
this conception of objective reasonableness.
However, the mainstream gloss on the doctrine focuses on
reasonableness and voluntariness: the consent inquiry seeks to identify
whether a person has volitionally given up her right to be free from an
otherwise unlawful search.36 This perspective can accommodate both the
perspective of a reasonable officer (whether the officer had reason to
believe that the consent was involuntary) and, at times, that of the citizen
herself. Under this schema, the act of permission is relevant but only one
consideration in determining whether the citizen voluntarily welcomed the
search. In practice, courts largely, but not uniformly, adopt the officer’s
perspective and ignore circumstances not readily obvious to an officer
during the encounter, such as the citizen’s prior experience with law
enforcement or education level.
Nonetheless, race is both relevant and meaningful regardless of which
perspective frames the analysis. Recognized widely across legal and
interdisciplinary scholarship is the belief that courts systematically
underestimate the coercive nature of police encounters when evaluating the
validity of consent.37 A recent empirical study of suppression motions in
federal court suggests that, absent a Fourth Amendment violation that
precedes an officers request to search, courts almost never find consent to
have been coerced.38
The following Sections discuss, in turn, the array of factors outlined in
Schneckloth and articulated by courts in the years since that are to be
considered in a consent to search analysis; the framing of the totality
inquiry; and the degree to which actual or presumptive societal knowledge
of a potentially coercive condition is relevant to the totality inquiry.
A.   Totality Factors Under Current Law
The factors considered in the totality of the circumstances test can be
fairly categorized as either describing the history and characteristics of the
the convergence (and divergence) between consent jurisprudence and Katz’s progeny may be another
worthwhile topic for future scholarship.
36
See, e.g., William Kluwin & Joseph Walkowski, Valid Consent to Search Determined by
Standard of “Voluntariness”—Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
231 (1974).
37
See, e.g., Nadler & Trout, supra note 1; John M. Burkoff, Search Me?, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV.
1109, 1114–15 (2007); Kaplan & Dixon, supra note 31, at 954–56; Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout:
Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 155; Sutherland, supra note 10,
at 2195.
38
Sutherland, supra note 10, at 2225 (“[I]n practice courts will find consent voluntary in the
absence of police misconduct.”).
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citizen, or describing the details of the encounter between the police officer
and citizen.39 The following sections provide an illustrative, but
nonexhaustive, summary of factors recognized as relevant by the Supreme
Court and lower courts. Subsequently, the Note turns to United States v.
Mendenhall and its explicit (but brief) recognition that race is a relevant
factor in the totality test.
1.   History and Characteristics of the Citizen
Schneckloth held that the “vulnerable subjective state of the person
who consents” was relevant to the totality inquiry,40 and the following
physical, cognitive, and experiential factors have been identified as relevant
indicia of such vulnerability.
Gender. The gender of the individual is relevant, and conventional
wisdom is that a court should more readily find coercion if the supposedly
consenting individual in question was a woman.41 However, there is reason
to doubt courts actually or consistently employ this rule.42
Age. The youth of an individual counsels in favor of finding
coercion,43 based on the assumption that younger persons will be more
easily manipulated by authority figures and more likely to believe they do
not have the right to refuse. There is no bright line in the case law when
“youth” ends and when an individual’s age no longer weighs in favor of
finding coercion.44 As a general matter, age seems to be a sliding scale,

39

See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).
Id. at 229.
41
See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558 (1980) (noting that gender can contribute to
a defendant feeling “unusually threatened” by police). But cf. United States v. Little, 18 F.3d 1499,
1505 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994) (refusing to apply an “across-the-board categorization[]” that “all women . . .
are always more vulnerable to coercion” (emphasis in original)).
42
Orit Gan, Third-Party Consent to Search: Analyzing Triangular Relations, 19 DUKE J. GENDER
L. & POL’Y 303, 346 (2012) (suggesting that consent search doctrine systematically employs an
analysis that is “a-contextual, gender-blind, and insensitive to power dynamics”). The historical and
sociological gender dynamics at play in consent searches raise important questions, but such a nuanced
discussion is far beyond the scope of this Note.
43
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226 (citing Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948) (finding
confession by fifteen-year-old defendant unconstitutionally coerced under the Fourteenth
Amendment)).
44
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 558 (finding that the age of a twenty-two-year-old defendant counseled
in favor of coercion, but that the totality of factors indicated voluntariness); United States v. Ward,
400 F. App’x 991, 994 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding that the age of a twenty-nine-year-old defendant
counseled in favor of finding valid consent); Crowe v. Cty. of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 437–38 & n.22
(9th Cir. 2010) (giving little to no weight to the age of a fourteen-year-old suspect in finding his consent
to a strip search valid); United States v. Esquivel, 507 F.3d 1154, 1159–60 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding that
the age of the defendants, who were at least thirty years old, counseled in favor of finding valid
consent); United States v. Renken, 474 F.3d 984, 988 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding that the age of a fortyseven-year-old defendant counseled in favor of finding valid consent); United States v. Boyd, 910 F.
40
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where the age of a young child weighs strongly in favor of involuntariness,
while the age of a young adult is less significant.
Intoxication. When an individual is drunk or otherwise impaired, there
is reason to doubt the voluntariness of her consent to search.45 This is
hardly controversial, especially when an individual is sufficiently
intoxicated to be obvious to an inquiring officer.
Lack of Education or Intelligence. A lack of education counsels in
favor of finding coercion,46 as does a lack of intelligence.47 The rationale is
that an individual lacking intelligence or education is “weaker and more
susceptible” to police manipulation and that police strategies that are
“utterly ineffective” against others could easily convince such a person to
consent.48
Belief That No Incriminating Evidence Will Be Found. Several lower
courts have concluded that an individual who believes that no incriminating
evidence will be found is less likely to have been coerced into granting
consent.49 An individual who subjectively believes she has nothing to hide
has little reason to be concerned about the police search, suggesting that her
initial consent is indeed voluntary and her protestations are merely post hoc
attempts to suppress evidence she did not think existed at the time of the
search.50 On the other hand, a subjective fear that incriminating evidence

Supp. 2d 995, 1002 (W.D. Mich. 2011) (finding that the age of an eighteen-year-old woman counseled
in favor of finding consent invalid).
45
See United States v. Va Lerie, 424 F.3d 694, 709–10 (8th Cir. 2005).
46
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226 (citing Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958)). In Payne, the
Court found that a confession by a “mentally dull” and “slow to learn” defendant with a fifth-grade
education was unconstitutionally coerced under the Fourteenth Amendment. 356 U.S. at 562 n.4; see
also Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 286 n.2 (1991) (applying the Schneckloth test to determine
whether confession was coerced and concluding that defendant’s fourth-grade education “support[ed] a
finding of coercion”).
47
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226 (citing Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 198 (1957) (finding that
the confession of a defendant “weak of will or mind” was unconstitutionally coerced)); United States v.
Stokely, 733 F. Supp. 2d 868, 903–04 (E.D. Tenn. 2010) (noting that the defendant was “intelligent”
and “well-spoken,” and that these traits “weigh[ed] in favor of a voluntary consent”); see also
Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 286 n.2 (applying the Schneckloth test to determine whether confession was
coerced and concluding that defendant’s “low average to average intelligence” “also support[ed] a
finding of coercion”).
48
Fikes, 352 U.S. at 197–98.
49
See, e.g., United States v. Solis, 299 F.3d 420, 436 n.21 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v.
Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1470 (5th Cir. 1993)); United States v. Jackson, 34 F. Supp. 3d 645, 648–49
(M.D. La. 2014) (citing United States v. Hernandez, 279 F.3d 302, 307 (5th Cir. 2002)).
50
This factor rests upon a flawed assumption: if an individual thought she had nothing to hide, then
“there would have been no reason for her to deny consent for a search.” Hernandez, 279 F.3d at 308. To
the contrary, an individual assuming she has nothing to hide may nonetheless prefer to deny consent for
many reasons, such as a desire for privacy, need to avoid delay, or awareness of her legal right to refuse
consent without probable cause.
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will be found suggests that she would have been less eager to voluntarily
consent to search, and therefore coercion may be have been necessary to
extract her consent.51 While seemingly straightforward, the Court has
elsewhere rejected this argument and has been unwilling to weigh a
citizen’s awareness of her own criminal conduct in favor of invalidating
consent.52
Prior Experience with Violence. Courts have found that coercion is
less likely if an individual had prior experience with violence, under the
assumption that such an individual is “less likely than most to be
intimidated by [police officers’] show of force.”53 Yet, the opposite
inference could just as easily be true: surviving a violent episode could
traumatize someone and leave them especially sensitive to future situations
that threaten violence.54
Prior Experience with and Knowledge of the Law. Courts will
presume that prior experience in and familiarity with the criminal justice
system counsels in favor of finding consent valid.55 For example, a novice
may interpret relatively innocuous police conduct as a precursor to
escalation or physical abuse, not recognizing that, for example, holstering a
gun infrequently leads to actual use of the gun. On the other hand, someone
who “had confronted the police before” is less likely to be intimidated by
them.56 This factor necessarily presumes that an individual with prior
experience with or knowledge of the law was not harassed, injured, or
mistreated during their prior encounter(s) with the criminal justice system
and police. If the prior encounter(s) indeed had been in any way traumatic,
this factor very well could counsel in favor of finding the consent coerced,
51

See Devon W. Carbado, (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 1004–05
(2002).
52
See id. at 1006 (“According to Justice O’Connor, the reasonable person standard presupposes an
innocent person. Her argument seems to be that, to the extent that a person is in possession of drugs, he
is not innocent. Stated more directly, he is factually guilty. Accordingly, such a person may not use the
fact of his guilt (possessing drugs) to vitiate his consent or to deny that he consented.”); Florida v.
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437–438 (1991).
53
See, e.g., United States v. Cepulonis, 530 F.2d 238, 244 (1st Cir. 1976).
54
See generally POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM:
RESTORING TRUST BETWEEN THE CHICAGO POLICE AND THE COMMUNITIES THEY SERVE (Apr. 2016),
https://chicagopatf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PATF_Final_Report_4_13_16-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MT3Q-CNP2].
55
Id.; Hubbard v. Tinsley, 350 F.2d 397, 398 (10th Cir. 1965) (finding that a defendant’s
“knowledge[] in investigative and legal proceedings” weighed in favor of voluntariness); see also
United States v. Perry, 703 F.3d 906, 909 (6th Cir. 2013) (giving significant weight to defendant’s fiftyseven prior arrests in finding her consent voluntary); People v. Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d 575, 581 (N.Y.
1976) (“A consent to search by a case-hardened sophisticate in crime, calloused in dealing with police,
is more likely to be the product of calculation than awe.”).
56
Cepulonis, 530 F.2d at 244.
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as those prior experiences would probably increase the likelihood that the
person would fear reprisal if she failed to consent.
2.   Encounter Between Citizen and Officer
Schneckloth also held that the “subtly coercive” conduct of police
officers was, quite obviously, relevant to the totality inquiry,57 and,
accordingly, courts have considered relevant the following circumstantial
and behavioral factors.
Knowledge of Right to Refuse Consent. When an individual has been
told that that she has the right to refuse consent, this fact weighs in favor of
finding consent voluntary and valid.58 However, “such knowledge” is not a
“prerequisite to establish[] a voluntary consent.”59 In other words, there is
no Fourth Amendment analog to the required Miranda warnings. As noted,
an individual’s ignorance of her constitutional right to refuse consent
weighs in favor of finding coercion, but this factor alone does not dispose
of the question.
Advice Given to Individual About Constitutional Rights. The Supreme
Court presumes that if police took the time to instruct an individual of her
constitutional rights, the police were less prone to abuse their constitutional
prerogative and the individual was less prone to involuntarily consent to a
search she knew she could constitutionally refuse.60 Yet, while failure to
inform counsels in favor of finding coercion,61 such a misstep is by no
means dispositive.62

57

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 229 (1973).
Id. at 249; United States v. Worley, 193 F.3d 380, 386–87 (6th Cir. 1999).
59
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 249.
60
This was the implicit logic of Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). In refusing to find the
consent to search involuntarily coerced, the Court said it was “particularly worth noting” that “the
police specifically advised Bostick that he had the right to refuse consent.” Id. at 432; see generally
Nadler, supra note 37.
61
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226 (citing Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740–41 (1966)
(finding that “not [being] advised of his rights” to remain silent and have counsel present weighed
strongly in favor of finding the confessions involuntary and coerced)).
62
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206–07 (2002) (finding that there was voluntary consent
despite the officers’ failure to notify the defendant that he could refuse to cooperate). In any event,
social science research suggests the initial presumption is likely misguided. See Nadler, supra note 37,
at 155. Professor Nadler astutely notes a crucial point of dissonance for the Court: just because police
conduct is polite and does not expressly threaten physical escalation, that does not mean such conduct is
not coercive. See id. The Court often conflates apparent politeness with a lack of coerciveness. See, e.g.,
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 432 (finding no coercion for several reasons, but a primary one being that “at no
time did the officers threaten Bostick with [the] gun” that one of the officers carried).
58
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Length of Detention. The longer an individual is detained by police,
the more likely that any subsequent consent was the product of coercion.63
Number of Police Officers Present. The more officers surrounding the
individual or in the close vicinity at the time of the request for consent, the
more likely that subsequent consent was the product of coercion.64 This is
intuitive. Cumulative coercive potential increases with the number of
officers present—an officer who may not take action on her own may feel
empowered to do so with the immediate support of her colleagues. The
opposite presumption is equally reasonable—an encounter with a single
officer could be more presumptively coercive, because a lone officer may
be more prone to commit misconduct without colleague–eyewitnesses—but
there is no indication that courts have adopted this view.
Nature of Questioning. Prolonged and repeated questioning—in which
an individual initially refuses consent but eventually grants it—calls into
question the voluntariness of the consent.65 Conversely, if consent is
granted immediately without repeated requests, the court may be less prone
to believe that the consent was the product of coercion.
Use of Physical Punishment. If there is evidence of physical abuse of
the individual by police prior to the granting of consent, this fact weighs in
favor of finding any consent the product of coercion.66
Voluntariness of Custodial Status. If an individual is being detained
against her will, such as in the back of a police car in handcuffs, her
consent is more likely to be the product of coercion.67 On the other hand,
consent granted while voluntarily in police custody, after, for example,
showing up to the police station on one’s own volition, weighs in favor of
finding the consent voluntary and valid.
Extent of Cooperation with Law Enforcement. The extent and level of
cooperation with police prior and subsequent to the grant of consent are
relevant considerations.68 The greater the degree of cooperation with police,
the more likely that the consent was voluntary and not coerced.

63

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226 (citing Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 239–40 (1940) (finding
that a lengthy confinement prior to the confession weighed in favor of finding the confession
involuntary and coerced)).
64
People v. Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d 575, 579–82 (N.Y. 1976).
65
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226 (citing Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 152–54 (1944)
(finding that a thirty-six-hour questioning period, with repeated questioning, weighed in favor of
finding the confession involuntary and coerced)).
66
Id. (citing Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 441–42 (1961) (finding that physical abuse during
questioning weighed in favor of finding confession involuntary and coerced)).
67
United States v. Jackson, 34 F. Supp. 3d 645, 649 (M.D. La. 2014).
68
Id. at 648; United States v. Walker, 254 F. App’x 300, 303 (5th Cir. 2007).
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Immediacy of Consent. Similar to the length of questioning and nature
of detention considerations above, consent granted with little to no delay is
less likely to be the product of coercion, while lengthy delay raises
voluntariness concerns.69
Officer Hostility or Display of Weapon. If an officer exhibited “overt
hostility” toward the individual,70 brandished a weapon,71 or made a threat
against the individual or a relative prior to the request for consent, any of
these actions counsel in favor of finding consent coerced. When police act
calmly, do not brandish their weapons, and do not expressly make threats,
courts view these facts as indicia of voluntariness.
Language Barrier. If there is a language barrier between the officer
and the individual, there is a greater likelihood that the individual did not
understand the officer’s request to search or the officer did not understand
the individual’s answer.72 This inquiry typically focuses on whether the
individual had sufficient English proficiency, but it need not do so if the
officer speaks another language.
Surrounding Atmosphere. The “examination of coercion” may extend
beyond “the acts of the officials requesting to perform the search” to
include the “coercive atmosphere” created by others in the vicinity.73 For
example, a surrounding crowd of civilians hostile to the individual in
question creates coercive conditions affecting the individual’s ability to
voluntarily consent.74
Preceding Fourth Amendment Violation. If the police committed a
Fourth Amendment violation prior to seeking consent, such as illegally
seizing the individual or entering a home without a warrant, courts are
highly suspicious of any subsequent consent.75

69

See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 573 F.3d 465, 477 (7th Cir. 2009).
United States v. Strache, 202 F.3d 980, 985 (7th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Glover,
104 F.3d 1570, 1584 (10th Cir. 1997).
71
Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 575 (1988); United States v. Telcy, 362 F. App’x 83, 86–
87 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Chan-Jimenez, 125 F.3d 1324, 1327 (9th Cir. 1997); United States
v. Edmond, 413 F. Supp. 1388, 1391 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
72
See, e.g., United States v. Guerrero, 374 F.3d 584, 588–89 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Amano, 229 F.3d 801, 804–05 (9th Cir. 2000).
73
Lopera v. Town of Coventry, 640 F.3d 388, 398 (1st Cir. 2011). In the context of the Fifth
Amendment and coerced confessions, the Supreme Court has focused more narrowly on the conduct of
the police and largely discounted such environmental considerations. See, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly,
479 U.S. 157, 163–64 (1986) (emphasizing the importance of police conduct in determining the
voluntariness of a confession under the Fifth Amendment).
74
Lopera, 640 F.3d at 398.
75
See Sutherland, supra note 10, at 2216–18.
70
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3.   Mendenhall and a Passing Nod to Race
In 1980, United States v. Mendenhall was the first explicit76
recognition by the Supreme Court that race was an appropriate and relevant
factor in the Schneckloth totality of the circumstances test.77 Sylvia
Mendenhall, a twenty-two-year-old black woman, was approached by
several white male Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents after
disembarking at Detroit Metropolitan Airport, and was subsequently asked
to accompany them to the DEA airport office for further questioning.78 In
the office, Mendenhall first consented to the officers’ request to search her
person and again consented to search when asked by a female officer who
had escorted her to a private adjacent room.79 As she undressed,
Mendenhall removed a package of heroin from her undergarments and
handed it to the officer.80 She was arrested for possession.81
Mendenhall sought to suppress the admission of the heroin, arguing
that her consent was coerced and thus involuntary.82 In conducting the
Schneckloth totality test, the Court noted that, because she was a woman
and “a Negro,” Mendenhall “may have felt unusually threatened by the
officers, who were white males.”83 At first blush, this recognition seems
like a monumental shift in the law: an explicit recognition by the Court that
an encounter between white law enforcement officers and a person of color
has a degree of inherent coerciveness. While Schneckloth “obscure[d] the
fact that, because of race, people are differentially situated with respect to
their vulnerability to police encounters,”84 Mendenhall provided an
opportunity for jurisprudential redemption. Yet, the Court immediately
downplayed the significance of race in this encounter, finding that the
totality of all factors—namely, the lack of threats, the lack of any
demonstration of force, the brief nature of questioning, Mendenhall’s
76

The Court had ample opportunities prior to 1980 to recognize the significance of race in
encounters between police officers and persons of color. See, e.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560,
561, 562 n.4 (1958) (suppressing the confession of a “mentally dull” “19-year-old Negro” as
impermissibly coerced under Fourteenth Amendment but making no mention of the role of race in the
analysis).
77
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558 (1980). The defendants in Schneckloth were
Hispanic, but the decision did not mention their race. Jesse-Justin Cuevas & Tonja Jacobi, The Hidden
Psychology of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 2161, 2197 & n.204 (2016).
78
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 547–48.
79
Id. at 548.
80
Id. at 549.
81
Id.
82
Id. She also argued that she had been illegally seized by the agents. Id. at 547. The Court
disagreed. Id. at 565–66.
83
Id. at 558.
84
Carbado, supra note 51, at 1013.
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physical possession of her ticket and identification, and the agents’
disclosure to Mendenhall that she was free to withhold consent—indicated
that she had indeed voluntarily consented to search.85 Importantly, the
Court did not provide any explanation of why race was relevant to this
inquiry.
In failing to provide any such commentary, the Court simultaneously
recognized as self-evident this coercive dynamic and hinted to lower courts
that this factor is not to be taken seriously. While the Supreme Court
insisted that it had “engaged in ‘unceasing efforts’ to eradicate racial
prejudice from our criminal justice system” several years later,86 this error
suggests otherwise. The Court’s subsequent failure to mention that the
defendants in Florida v. Bostick87 and United States v. Drayton88 were black
while validating their supposed consent to search only further highlights
the falsity of this claim. Notwithstanding the negligible doctrinal effect of
Mendenhall’s mention of race to date, pervasive awareness of police
misconduct presents a compelling rationale for why race, which remains
relevant for other reasons as well,89 must be considered in consent search
cases and thus provides an analytic framework for evaluating race that
Mendenhall failed to articulate.
B.   The Proper Perspective for Framing the Inquiry
“Although the Supreme Court in Schneckloth suggested that a
defendant could try to invalidate the consent to search based on numerous
subjective factors relating to the suspect’s mental state or character, it is a
rare case in which the court actually analyzes any of these factors.”90 Over
time, the Court’s consent search jurisprudence has increasingly limited the
inquiry to an objective officer’s perspective of the encounter.91 That is, the
85

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 558–60; see Cuevas & Jacobi, supra note 77, at 2202 (noting that
Mendenhall “paid lip service to her subjective characteristics (young, uneducated, black, and female)
but did not delve into them”).
86
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309 (1987) (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85
(1986)).
87
501 U.S. 429 (1991).
88
536 U.S. 194 (2002).
89
See generally Carbado, supra note 51 (discussing the various interplays between race and the
Fourth Amendment).
90
See Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 221–22
(2001).
91
See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990) (The “determination of consent . . .
must be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment . . .
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the
premises?” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Little, 18 F.3d 1499, 1505 (10th Cir.
1994) (“[T]he particular personal traits or subjective state of mind of the defendant are irrelevant . . .
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question has largely become whether a reasonable officer would conclude
that the citizen voluntarily consented to the search.
This is the trend, to be sure, but it is not without exceptions in the
Court’s own cases92 as well as those adjudicated by lower courts.93 In the
Ninth Circuit, a district court must consider “whether the advice of rights
was in the defendant’s native language” and “whether the defendant had
experience with the American criminal justice system” when reviewing the
alleged consent of a foreign national.94 The Ninth Circuit likewise requires
the court to consider “whether the defendant appeared to understand those
rights”95—the use of “appeared” in this factor compels adoption of the
perspective of the officer, while its omission in the preceding factors
suggests the actual characteristics (not just those apparent to the officer) are
relevant to this analysis.96
When a court considers the characteristics of the actual defendant and
the group-based assumptions associated with her, instead of replacing her
with a “reasonable person” in the analysis, it avoids the perspective bias
that distorts other objective tests under the Fourth Amendment. In those
cases, the “reasonable person” contemplated by the court is commonly
intelligent, white, and male, regardless of the actual characteristics of the
individual in question or the general characteristics of the population from
which that person comes.97 Explicit consideration of race here might force

other than to the extent that they may have been known to the officer and influenced his conduct.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
92
In their J.D.B. v. North Carolina dissent, Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito,
Clarence Thomas, and Antonin Scalia criticized the majority’s consideration of factors beyond those
objectively apparent to law enforcement in determining whether a defendant was in custody under
Miranda. 564 U.S. 261, 286 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting). In so doing, the dissent emphasized that,
unlike Miranda’s exclusive focus on “objective circumstances of the interrogation,” the Schneckloth
voluntariness inquiry required consideration of “the details of the interrogation and the characteristics
of the accused.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). This juxtaposition was an implicit
admission by several justices largely unsympathetic to subjective considerations that the consent search
inquiry requires consideration of certain factors that may not be readily and objectively observable to an
officer.
93
See Sutherland, supra note 10, at 2199–200 (discussing the muddled and inconsistent application
of objective and subjective considerations).
94
See United States v. Amano, 229 F.3d 801, 804–05 (9th Cir. 2000).
95
Id.
96
Similarly, it would be quite rare for an officer to know about a citizen’s prior experience with the
U.S. criminal justice system. Thus, when the Ninth Circuit considers such experience, it reaches beyond
those facts objectively observable to the officer at the time of the encounter.
97
Cuevas & Jacobi, supra note 77, at 2188–91; see Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth
Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 56 (2003) (“How the ‘reasonable person’ would
behave or feel during interactions with the police is in effect judged from the perspective of the middleclass white person expecting police protection rather than the poor person familiar with police abuse.”).
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courts employing such “objective” standards to reflect upon this systemic
bias.
C.   Awareness of Distrust and Its Root Causes
While the framing inquiry discussed above is important with regard to
certain totality factors, the framing distinction makes little difference here
because societal awareness of the fact that communities of color have a
heightened distrust (and in some instances, fear) of law enforcement is
pervasive. That is, if a court is willing to consider the perspective of the
citizen, it would find a reasonable person of color more distrustful of law
enforcement and thus her consent more likely coerced. On the other hand,
if a court is only looking at factors objectively discernable to an officer,
any reasonable officer would be aware of this distrust, just as she would be
aware that a person surrounded by several officers is more prone to feel
coerced. Leaders within the law enforcement community have publicly
recognized this dynamic. Terry Cunningham, President of the International
Association of Chiefs of Police, recently apologized for “historical
mistreatment of communities of color” hoping to break a “historic cycle of
mistrust.”98 He further acknowledged that the “dark side of our shared
history has created a multigenerational—almost inherited—mistrust
between many communities of color and their law enforcement agencies.”99
Further, there is ample anecdotal evidence that ordinary officers are well
aware themselves.100 As astutely observed by Professor Matthew Tokson, in
the context of the Fourth Amendment, courts regularly (and seemingly
without controversy) impute knowledge to an individual when the
information is generally accessible in her community.101 Professor Tokson
98

Merrit Kennedy, Head of Police Chiefs Group Apologies for ‘Historical Mistreatment’ of
Minorities, NPR (Oct. 18, 2016, 11:16 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/10/18/
498380373/head-of-police-chiefs-group-apologizes-for-historical-mistreatment-of-minorities
[https://perma.cc/QJ4G-PK7Y].
99
Id.
100
See, e.g., Lindsey Bever & Andrew deGrandpre, ‘We Only Kill Black People,’ a Cop Told a
Woman — On Camera. Now He’ll Lose His Job., WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2017), http://wapo.st/
2x8CsBi?tid=ss_mail&utm_term=.9722b99ce052 [https://perma.cc/UN29-PX4N].
101
Matthew Tokson, Knowledge and Fourth Amendment Privacy, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 139, 149–52
(2017). Professor Tokson’s critique focuses mostly on the evolution of the Katz test and waiver
doctrine, but his observations about so-called “societal knowledge” are no less relevant here:
Courts’ failure to recognize the complex, multilevel nature of knowledge often leads them to find
that people have knowingly waived their Fourth Amendment rights on very thin evidence. In
many cases, a vague or general awareness of the possibility of personal data collection is
sufficient to vitiate Fourth Amendment rights. For example, the Supreme Court held that dialed
telephone numbers were not private in part because customers have “some awareness” that
telephone companies can record their numbers, and because many phone books contain a page
with text implying that companies can track harassing calls.
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suggests that societal knowledge plays an important role in Fourth
Amendment law because the Court equates “vague or general awareness”
of certain facts with actual knowledge.102
To be sure, decades of mass media coverage of high-profile incidents,
from Birmingham in 1963 to Los Angeles in 1991 and extensive coverage
of contemporary incidents across traditional and social media, have created
much more than the vague or general awareness required for anyone in the
United States to know—as knowledge is conceived under the Fourth
Amendment—about these unfortunate realities and their psychological
effects in communities of color. Whether the court is analyzing a consent
search through the eyes of a citizen of color or a police officer, it would
presume at least general knowledge of the racial history, recent high-profile
events, and the obvious psychological effect that such facts have on
communities of color.103 At the same time, “general awareness” within a
community of a particular police officer’s or a department’s efforts to
improve police–community relations and a track record of respectful and
collaborative policing could partially mitigate the weight given to the
coercive psychological effects of police misconduct writ large.
It is important to clarify one point: it is irrelevant whether a specific
officer or even the entire law enforcement community believes that a
specific incident was justified and a lawful use of force. There is ample
evidence that police and the general public do not see eye-to-eye on these
issues,104 and there is a common sentiment among the police community
that media treatment of their profession is fundamentally unfair and
inaccurate.105 However, none of these findings undermine the self-evident
assumption that police are aware of widespread public distrust, especially
by individuals of color.
Furthermore, some courts do not require direct evidence of actual societal awareness, only
the potential for awareness evinced by available articles or blog posts.
Id. at 171 (footnotes omitted).
102
Id. at 171.
103
Geographic and temporal proximity likely counsel greater weight for race in the totality inquiry.
While some incidents may have significant local salience but fail to resonate more broadly, many recent
incidents, such as Michael Brown’s death, clearly gained national prominence.
104
See, e.g., Renee Stepler, Key Findings on How Police View Their Jobs Amid Protests and Calls
for Reform, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 11, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/11/policekey-findings [https://perma.cc/4C64-PRFL] (finding that 67% of police officers believe recent deaths of
black suspects during encounters with police are “isolated incidents,” while 60% of the public believes
they are “[s]igns of a broader problem”).
105
See John Gramlich & Kim Parker, Most Officers Say the Media Treat Police Unfairly, PEW
RES. CTR. (Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/25/most-officers-say-themedia-treat-police-unfairly [https://perma.cc/WQ2M-8KFQ] (finding that 81% of police officers either
“agree” or “strongly agree” that “the media treat police unfairly”).
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Under either framing paradigm, any inquiry into the officer’s
perspective is relevant only insofar as it seeks to discern whether the officer
knew or should have reasonably known that the citizen would have felt
coerced. Whether an officer personally disagrees with the public
characterization of a specific incident is doctrinally irrelevant; it is the
existence and orientation of the public characterization and its self-evident
impact on individuals of color that matters under the Schneckloth totality
test.
Moreover, ascertaining law enforcement’s understanding of beliefs
held in communities of color is not a new endeavor for the courts. In
rejecting a per se rule that flight from police in high-crime areas justifies a
Terry stop,106 Justice John Paul Stevens, in his partial concurrence and
partial dissent in Illinois v. Wardlow, made an observation that has only
proven more true in the intervening years:
Among some citizens, particularly minorities and those residing in high crime
areas, there is also the possibility that the fleeing person is entirely innocent,
but, with or without justification, believes that contact with the police can
itself be dangerous, apart from any criminal activity associated with the
officer’s sudden presence. For such a person, unprovoked flight is neither
“aberrant” nor “abnormal.” Moreover, these concerns and fears are known to
the police officers themselves, and are validated by law enforcement
investigations into their own practices. Accordingly, the evidence supporting
the reasonableness of these beliefs is too pervasive to be dismissed as random
or rare, and too persuasive to be disparaged as inconclusive or insufficient. In
any event, just as we do not require “scientific certainty” for our
commonsense conclusion that unprovoked flight can sometimes indicate
suspicious motives, neither do we require scientific certainty to conclude that
unprovoked flight can occur for other, innocent reasons.107

The “belie[f] that contact with the police can itself be dangerous” in
communities of color was no secret in 2000, and it has only become more
widely recognized through the growth of social media;108 cell phone,
106

When an “officer has a reasonable suspicion that an individual is armed, engaged, or about to be
engaged, in criminal conduct, the officer may briefly stop and detain an individual for a pat-down
search of outer clothing.” Terry Stop / Stop and Frisk, LEGAL INFO. INST.: WEX LEGAL DICTIONARY,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/terry_stop_stop_and_frisk [https://perma.cc/A9N3-BBVP]. This is
called a Terry stop, named after the Supreme Court case that promulgated the rule. See Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968). It is also known colloquially as “stop and frisk.”
107
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 132–35 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (emphasis added) (internal citations and footnotes omitted); see also id. at 132–35 & nn.7, 9
(citing studies supporting these observations).
108
Social Media Plays Major Role in National Debate on Police Violence, PBS NEWSHOUR (July
15, 2016, 2:12 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/social-media-plays-major-role-national-debatepolice-brutality [https://perma.cc/7RJJ-UA58].
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dashboard, and body cameras that capture such episodes in vivid detail;109
and large social movements, such as Black Lives Matter, that have pushed
these issues to the fore of public discourse.110 Even if an officer claimed
ignorance of a recent incident or, more incredulously, the history of
racialized policing, or if the officer sought to prove that the citizen likewise
lacked such knowledge, it would be anomalous in the Fourth Amendment
context to ignore “general awareness” of such widely accessible
information and pervasive sociocultural beliefs.
*

*

*

In sum, the Fourth Amendment generally prohibits warrantless
searches, but a warrantless search is constitutional if a citizen consents—
without being coerced—to the search. To determine whether consent was
coerced, courts balance all relevant circumstances, including the
characteristics of the citizen herself and the nature of her encounter with
the officer. The inquiry into whether consent was coerced is a muddled
combination of whether the citizen voluntarily consented to the search and
whether the officer’s search was reasonable. There is significantly
heightened distrust of law enforcement in communities of color, and these
sentiments are (and likely have long been) well-known facts in the law
enforcement community. Nearly forty years ago, the Court acknowledged
that race may be a relevant circumstance to consider when evaluating the
coerciveness of a consent search, but courts have since ignored race
entirely in such cases.
II.   THE COERCIVE EFFECTS OF DISTRUST AND FEAR
There is a mountain of evidence documenting higher degrees of
distrust of police in communities of color and suggesting that this distrust
is, among other causes, the product of direct experiences with and indirect
observations of excessive and unjustified use of force.111 While the most
109

Laura Ly, Can Cell Phones Stop Police Brutality?, CNN (Nov. 19, 2014, 5:31 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/18/us/police-cell-phone-videos [https://perma.cc/Z7MM-7BZJ]; Daniella
Silva, Video Cases Show Tension Between Police, Transparency Advocates, NBC NEWS (July 12, 2017,
7:22
PM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/video-cases-show-tension-between-policetransparency-advocates-n782401 [https://perma.cc/4J2A-ENLP].
110
David Crary, AP Poll: US Election Voted Top News Story of 2016, AP (Dec. 21, 2016),
http://elections.ap.org/content/ap-poll-us-election-voted-top-news-story-2016 [https://perma.cc/CW669Z44] (noting that “Black Men Killed by Police” was the third most important story of 2016, trailing
only the U.S. presidential election and Brexit).
111
See, e.g., Matthew Desmond et al., Police Violence and Citizen Crime Reporting in the Black
Community, 81 AM. SOC. REV. 857, 858 (2016) (“[H]igh-profile cases of police misconduct[] contribute
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egregious hallmarks of Jim Crow have abated and “smart on crime” has
increasingly displaced an older, pure “tough on crime” approach,112 this
distrust persists and, some may argue, has even increased in recent years as
developments in recording technology and media have created “more
scrutiny of the police and their role in our democratic society today than
there has been at any time since the 1960s.”113 Professor Tom R. Tyler has
aptly described this phenomenon:

to the spread of legal cynicism within black communities.”); Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch,
Racially Biased Policing: Determinants of Citizen Perceptions, 83 SOC. FORCES 1009, 1011–12 (2005)
(citing numerous studies and noting that “exposure to media reports on incidents of police misconduct
(e.g., Rodney King) may adversely affect citizens’ confidence in the police, and this effect may be
especially true for members of minority groups”); Michael Potere, Note, Who Will Watch the
Watchmen?: Citizens Recording Police Conduct, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 273, 314–15 (2012) (discussing
the “institutionalization of distrust” caused by viral videos of police misconduct); Bruce Drake,
Ferguson Highlights Deep Divisions Between Blacks and Whites in America, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 26,
2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/11/26/ferguson-highlights-deep-divisions-betweenblacks-and-whites-in-america [https://perma.cc/56Y2-EQUY] (noting that 76% of black Americans
expressed not too much or no confidence in any investigation of the police shooting of Michael Brown
in Ferguson, Missouri, while 52% of white Americans expressed confidence in the investigation);
Rachel Gandy, One Institution, Two Different Views: How Black and White Americans Regard the
Police, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (July 2, 2015), www.prisonpolicy/org/blog/2015/07/02/
police_confidence [https://perma.cc/W6ZZ-NWW8] (noting that in 2015, 57% of white Americans
reported “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in police, but only 30% of black Americans
expressed such confidence); Jeffrey M. Jones, Urban Blacks in U.S. Have Little Confidence in Police,
GALLUP (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/179909/urban-blacks-little-confidence-police.aspx
[https://perma.cc/GFE8-CDA6] (observing that 62% of urban, white Americans have confidence in
police, while only 26% of urban, black Americans do); Perceptions of Treatment by Police, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE: NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.nij.gov/topics/law-enforcement/
legitimacy/pages/perceptions.aspx [https://perma.cc/74FU-FLJ8] (“Frequent exposure to media reports
of police abuse or corruption is a strong predictor of perceptions of misconduct and supports the belief
that it is common. African-Americans who live in high-crime areas and who regularly hear others talk
about police misconduct are especially likely to believe misconduct is common.”). The Chicago Police
Accountability Task Force report issued in April 2016, “Recommendations for Reform: Restoring Trust
Between the Chicago Police and the Communities They Serve,” also provides a methodical exposition
of these dynamics. POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, supra note 54.
112
The Attorney General’s Smart on Crime Initiative, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Mar. 9, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/ag/attorney-generals-smart-crime-initiative [https://perma.cc/CG29PXSC]. While Attorney General Jeff Sessions has unwound some of this progress in the early months
of the Trump Administration, see Jeff Sessions, Being Soft on Sentencing Means More Violent Crime.
It’s Time to Get Tough Again., WASH. POST (June 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/jeff-sessions-being-soft-on-sentencing-means-more-violent-crime-its-time-to-get-tough-again/
2017/06/16/618ef1fe-4a19-11e7-9669-250d0b15f83b_story.html [https://perma.cc/EZ9M-9E5V], the
fact remains that a broad bipartisan consensus—at the federal and state levels—continues to support
this shift. New Poll Suggests Surprising Support for Criminal Justice Reforms Among Trump Voters,
CHARLES KOCH INST. (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.charleskochinstitute.org/news/new-poll-suggestssurprising-support-criminal-justice-reforms-among-trump-voters/ [https://perma.cc/KLQ9-UTRH].
113
Tom R. Tyler, From Harm Reduction to Community Engagement: Redefining the Goals of
American Policing in the Twenty-First Century, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1537, 1540 (2017).
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One can hardly turn on the news these days without seeing videos depicting
instances of police conduct that some perceive as questionable, if not outright
wrong and illegal. It seems likely that these incidents are not a new
phenomenon but rather in step with a long history of police violence,
particularly toward members of the African-American community. However,
such violence—whether justified or not—has seldom been so widely
accessible to the general public. Furthermore, video carries an emotional
impact not present in written news reports.114

Such footage, combined with the “everyday contacts with officers that over
time carry great weight in shaping public trust,”115 only reinforces the
sentiment that a request for consent to search may indeed be “backed by
force.”116
While this racial disparity and the causal links are likely self-evident
to most readers, these topics nonetheless deserve some explication here.
“[O]ver the past ten years, the carceral state’s increasingly visible racial
disparities—in particular its most punitive and aggressive actions—seem to
have crossed a threshold of public recognition.”117 But awareness of these
disparities and their high costs is not of recent origin in communities of
color, where incidents of excessive and unjustified use of force have left
deep physical and emotional scars on direct victims, their families, and
others throughout their proximate and national communities. Such
traumatic events “overwhelm[] the nervous system” and “organize . . .
[bodily] function[s] to respond and cope with the threat to” life.118 The
psychological effects of trauma are not only long-lasting but can also
undermine one’s ability to refuse consent even in the absence of physical
duress.119 Importantly, it is the perception of danger (not objective indicia
114

Id. at 1543–44.
Id. at 1557.
116
Nadler & Trout, supra note 1, at 332.
117
Jonathan Simon, Racing Abnormality, Normalizing Race: The Origins of America’s Peculiar
Carceral State and Its Prospects for Democratic Transformation Today, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1625,
1646 (2017).
118
Walter Howard Smith, Jr., The Impact of Racial Trauma on African Americans 1 (Heinz
Endowments,
Policy
Paper
2010),
http://www.heinz.org/userfiles/
impactofracialtraumaonafricanamericans.pdf [https://perma.cc/XN5A-TYZF].
119
In the context of sexual assault, Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer has identified the power of fear
to coerce compliance and render physical force unnecessary. See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Rape On and
Off Campus, 65 EMORY L.J. 1, 30 (2015) (“[A] narrow temporal frame does not correspond to the
phenomenology of fear. From the perspective of the person experiencing it, fear of the defendant—
whether based on his behavior just moments beforehand or years earlier—is fear of the defendant;
either way, its presence can render unnecessary the use of force to achieve nonconsensual
intercourse.”). While there are obvious and important differences between sexual assault and the
situations discussed in this Note, Professor Tuerkheimer’s scholarship provides an insightful look into
the sociopsychological power of fear.
115
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of risk) that conjures the initial trauma and triggers “intense emotional
response[s]” to future stimuli.120 By repeatedly observing, hearing, reading,
and, increasingly, watching video footage of these abuses in their
communities, people in these communities experience powerful “secondary
trauma”: “Living in black and poor neighborhoods increases one’s risk of
experiencing traumatic events like . . . police incidents . . . and it increases
the risk of experiencing secondary traumas in witnessing these dangers.”121
Put simply, “vicarious experiences of the police can be as powerful in
influencing one’s attitudes as direct, personal experiences.”122
The effect of such secondary trauma is significant and extends far
beyond people who knew the victim or witnessed the incident firsthand.123
Individual risk assessment and trust shift as trauma physically experienced
by others is “internalized and vicariously experienced,”124 and when built
upon generations of discrimination, the effects are amplified.125 Research
suggests that in the context of police violence, news coverage can “trigger[]
very strong emotion[s]” in African-American viewers because
“[r]epeatedly witnessing African Americans suffering on television news is
painful.”126 Research also suggests that preexisting “negative perceptions”
about police resulting from first-hand experience and/or socialization “are
reinforced when they see media coverage of police abuses in other

120

Smith, Jr., supra note 118, at 1–2; see also id. (“Because perception shapes what is dangerous,
past experiences become important in understanding how people interpret what situations and
experiences are dangerous.”).
121
Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
122
Rod K. Brunson & Ronald Weitzer, Negotiating Unwelcome Police Encounters: The
Intergenerational Transmission of Conduct Norms, 40 J. CONTEMP. ETHNOGRAPHY 425, 429 (2011)
(citing studies).
123
Erlanger A. Turner & Jasmine Richardson, Racial Trauma Is Real: The Impact of Police
Shootings on African Americans, PSYCHOL. BENEFITS SOC’Y (July 14, 2016),
https://psychologybenefits.org/2016/07/14/racial-trauma-police-shootings-on-african-americans
[https://perma.cc/WV6J-39T9] (“In addition to the mental health symptoms of individuals who have
encounters with law enforcement, those who witness these events directly or indirectly may also be
impacted negatively.”).
124
Weitzer & Tuch, supra note 111, at 1011–12 (internal quotations omitted).
125
See Smith, Jr., supra note 118, at 3–4 (“Racism and other social biases describe social
conditions that contain traumatic events for large numbers of persons.”); id. at 4 (“African Americans
experience specific events of danger related to race that overwhelm the nervous system . . . . The
aggressors may be black or white. These events stand out in our memory and have long-term impact on
our perception of ourselves and our social environments.”). As noted by Dr. Smith, these dynamics
exist even when the police officers are also persons of color, and therefore, the race of a consenting
citizen should be a relevant consideration even when the arresting officer is also a person of color.
126
Id. at 4.
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cities.”127 “With the proliferation of portable video recording technology,
police misconduct that was once witnessed only by immediate bystanders
can now be viewed around the world,” and “the rise of Internet-based news
sources and 24-hour news networks provide[s] a powerful medium for
broadcasting police misconduct.”128 Thus, even when an incident of alleged
police misconduct occurs halfway across the country, the pervasive belief
for many persons of color that “police/citizen encounters are potentially life
threatening” is further reinforced.129
This powerful sentiment in turn affects how people of color interact
with law enforcement. The pervasive concern in communities of color that
police are prone to use excessive force is heightened by the common
perception that officers are not held accountable for their illegal actions,
and thus, there is little deterrence of violent misconduct.130 Deeply sown
distrust increases one’s perceived likelihood that law enforcement would
react disproportionately or violently if one refused to comply with police
requests or instructions, even if that refusal were respectful and lawful.
Even if a citizen knows her legal rights (which few people do), her internal
risk calculus may support sacrificing intangible legal rights (with mediumand long-term consequences) for the decreased likelihood of short-term
tangible (i.e., physical) harm.131 The psychological effects of distrust and
their manifestations during citizen–police encounters are surely only
intensified with each reminder on the nightly news or Facebook of a recent
violent incident. Indeed, research suggests:
[P]arents seemingly gave officers the benefit of the doubt during involuntary
contacts and believed that if there was an altercation, youths were likely
blameworthy. Alternatively, interviewees’ warnings to today’s youth about
the importance of showing their hands, avoiding any sudden movements, and
not running suggest a widespread concern about the appropriateness of . . .
officers’ actions.132

According to Professor Devon Carbado, even in the absence of a
recent high-profile incident, the presence of deep-seated “racial stereotypes
127

Brunson & Weitzer, supra note 122, at 439–40 (discussing the “multiplier effect” of “media
reinforcement of preexisting negative opinions and adverse personal experiences” in communities of
color).
128
Desmond et al., supra note 111, at 857.
129
Carbado, supra note 51, at 1014 n.274.
130
Bruce Drake, Divide Between Blacks and Whites on Police Runs Deep, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr.
28,
2015),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/04/28/blacks-whites-police/
[https://perma.cc/32D5-Q8KJ] (“Seven-in-ten blacks said police forces across the country did a poor
job of holding officers accountable when misconduct occurred, compared with 27% of whites.”).
131
See Carbado, supra note 51, at 1014.
132
Brunson & Weitzer, supra note 122, at 443–44.
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[creates] . . . greater pressure for blacks to say yes to consent searches
than . . . for whites.”133 This is because persons of color are aware of the
racial stereotype that people of color are more prone to be criminals and
thus they are less likely to assert their rights because such conduct “can
racially aggravate or intensify the encounter, increasing the person of
color’s vulnerability to physical violence, arrest, or both.”134 Accordingly, it
would be strange to suggest these psychological effects—which are
regularly triggered with visceral reminders of ongoing racialized
violence—are irrelevant to the totality of circumstances affecting the
voluntariness of one’s consent.
While some, including several current Justices, believe that
acknowledging and addressing the salience of race in the relationship
between people and the state may itself contribute to racial
discrimination,135 Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s impassioned dissent in Utah v.
Strieff136 makes quite clear that such deliberate ignorance of the relevance
of race in warrantless searches requires nothing short of willful blindness.
Invoking the collective voice of Michelle Alexander, James Baldwin,
W.E.B. Du Bois, and Ta-Nehisi Coates, Justice Sotomayor describes the
myriad ways “black and brown parents” have, for decades, tried to keep
their children safe, “all out of fear of how an officer with a gun will react to
them.”137 She recognizes that “the countless people who are routinely
targeted by police are [not] ‘isolated.’ They are the canaries in the coal
mine whose deaths, civil and literal, warn us that no one can breathe in this
atmosphere.”138 If a person of color feels that her “body is subject to
invasion while courts excuse the violation of [her] rights,”139 her consent to
search should quite clearly raise suspicions about coercion. While Justice
Sotomayor spoke alone on the Court in making this bold pronouncement,
she joined a growing chorus of voices demanding that our justice system
take seriously the complex and important role of race in the law—the
Fourth Amendment in particular.

133

Carbado, supra note 51, at 1017.
Id. at 1014.
135
See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007)
(plurality opinion) (“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the
basis of race.”).
136
136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064–71 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
137
Id. at 2070.
138
Id. at 2071.
139
Id. at 2070.
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III.   RACE MUST BE CONSIDERED WHEN EVALUATING
CONSENT TO SEARCH
This Note has urged that past and ongoing mistreatment of
communities of color has heightened their distrust of law enforcement;
facilitated by new technology and media, there is broad social awareness of
new citizen–police encounters that end violently; this coverage further
heightens and reinforces the distrust well beyond the immediate victims;
this distrust manifests by coercing consent to search; courts are supposed to
consider all relevant circumstances when determining whether a consent to
search was permissibly granted or involuntarily coerced; and, to date,
courts have failed to recognize the coercive effect of this distrust or its
amplification in the aftermath of a highly publicized incident. Thus, it is
long past time that courts realize the unfulfilled promise from Mendenhall
and recognize the importance race deserves under the Schneckloth totality
test. To be sure, heightened distrust caused by the legacy and recent
reminders of police violence is only one of many reasons why race may be
relevant to the coerciveness of a consent search. That said, it captures an
important reason. Merely urging courts to take race seriously as a factor
without analytical guidance would, based on past practice, be a fruitless
exercise, as they have proven incapable of giving that consideration real
weight absent clear and specific articulation of why it matters so much.
While there has been an “ever-widening gap between Fourth
Amendment consent jurisprudence . . . and scientific findings about the
psychology of compliance and consent,”140 this conception of race easily
comports with factors routinely considered in consent search cases, it
would serve the fundamental purpose of the totality inquiry, and it is
applicable even if the totality inquiry is limited to the beliefs of a
reasonable officer. Serious consideration of race would pay homage to
Justice Sotomayor’s demand that our legal institutions open their eyes to
painfully clear instances of institutionalized racism and the resulting
injustices.141 The Fourth Amendment is an ideal focal point for addressing
these issues because it allows courts to consider systemic injustices vis-àvis their effects on individuals through person-to-person interactions. While
this conception of race as a factor in the totality inquiry raises line-drawing
questions and concerns about behavioral incentives, the inherent advantage
of a totality test is that it allows for theoretical and general problems to be
ironed out in the practical application to specific facts.142
140

Nadler, supra note 37, at 155; see generally Cuevas & Jacobi, supra note 77.
See supra notes 136–139 and accompanying text.
142
This Note does not separately discuss the application of this factor to third-party consent, an
especially puzzling aspect of Fourth Amendment law. See Stephanie M. Godfrey & Kay Levine, Much
141
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A.   Race Is Indistinguishable from Factors Routinely Considered
Under Schneckloth
Many factors routinely considered under the totality of circumstances
test rely in large part on unsupported behavioral assumptions about certain
groups.143 For example, there is a presumption that a woman’s granting of
consent is more likely the product of coercion, based on the (unproven)
assumption that a woman is more likely than a man to apprehend
consequences for noncompliance with police requests. As discussed above
in Section I.A, courts employ equally blunt assumptions about age,
intelligence, and other factors. To the extent courts consider as relevant
facts not readily observable to an officer, they contemplate a citizen’s prior
encounters with police and her familiarity with the criminal justice system
and assume that hardened criminals are less likely to be coerced, while
citizens suffering prior abuse at the hands of police are more likely to be.
Courts also consider aspects of the citizen–police encounter that are beyond
the control of the officer, such as a menacing nearby crowd.
Recognizing race as an important and relevant factor naturally
follows. The assumption that a person of color is more likely to feel
coerced into consenting (and that this coercive effect is amplified by either
local or high-profile incidents of reported police brutality) is no different
(logically or doctrinally) than the assumptions that motivate other factors.
Unlike the experience of a single person’s encounters with law
enforcement, which is not readily apparent to an officer, it is readily
obvious that communities of color have less trust after decades of
oppression or persistent local mistreatment at the hands of a particular
officer.144 Importantly, while a given officer does not have control over the
misconduct of other officers in other precincts, wards, cities, and states, and
the corresponding distrust it may engender, that does not mean the officer
Ado About Randolph: The Supreme Court Revisits Third Party Consent, 42 TULSA L. REV. 731, 735–38
(2007) (describing third-party consent jurisprudence). Yet, there is no reason to suspect this factor
would apply differently when determining whether a third person consented to the search of (typically)
another’s private property. Fear of retribution or mistreatment is just as pronounced when the police
seek a person’s consent, even if the person or her property are not the targeted subject of the search. A
third party—even if she had nothing to hide and knew she had done nothing illegal—is no less
susceptible to the coercive effects of distrust and fear.
143
This Note takes no position on the accuracy of these group-based assumptions, other than to
note that these assumptions, without empirical support, routinely guide courts in their Schneckloth
analysis. Even if empirical proof were required, there is abundant research identifying racially
correlated coerciveness caused by distrust and fear.
144
Noah
Berlatsky,
When
Chicago
Tortured,
ATLANTIC
(Dec.
17,
2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/12/chicago-police-torture-jon-burge/383839/
[https://perma.cc/4G69-YRZJ] (recounting the horrors committed by Chicago Police Commander Jon
Burge).
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is unaware of such dynamics, nor is there any doctrinal requirement that an
officer have control over a coercive condition for it to be relevant.145 When
a citizen is stopped by an officer, she has no way to know whether that
officer is in the majority of peaceful, careful, and respectful officers or in
the minority of short-tempered, violent ones.
Undoubtedly, conceiving race under Schneckloth raises some linedrawing and weight questions that may not be implicated by other factors.
As noted below, many of these questions are unanswerable ex ante because
the totality test requires contextual and fact-bound analysis.146 Thus, instead
of outlining a robust set of bright-line decisional rules for applying this
factor, this Note suggests that commonsense and sensitivity to our nation’s
racial history should guide judicial application.
B.   The Totality Inquiry Is Incomplete Without Race
The failure to acknowledge the relevance of race ignores a potentially
significant coercive condition in certain requests for consent. Yet,
Schneckloth commanded that, to respect “society’s deeply felt belief that
the criminal law cannot be used as an instrument of unfairness,”147 courts
must apply “careful scrutiny [to] all the surrounding circumstances.”148
Heightened and widespread distrust in communities of color is undoubtedly
one such circumstance, as are high-profile incidents of police misconduct
that intensify that distrust. Schneckloth made plain that even “subtly
coercive” factors require scrutiny;149 so, that nuance may be required to
understand a topic as complex as race hardly excuses its consideration.
Thus, the only basis for continuing to ignore race would be if historical
mistreatment and contemporary high-profile incidents had zero
psychological impact: even if the quantum of effect is small, which it likely
is not, there is no reason to excuse courts from considering this relevant
factor. The proper process would be to consider race and accord it the
weight it deserves in conjunction with the other facts at hand. The notion
that the effect is indeed zero is demonstrably false, so the totality inquiry
cannot be complete until race is routinely considered in consent search
145

Judges primarily concerned with behavioral incentives may balk at this rule because it suggests
that there is a baseline degree of coerciveness that a police officer cannot eliminate, regardless of her
behavior. And they would be correct: that is reality. While the foundational coerciveness is beyond the
control of a given officer, consistent consideration of race would encourage her to reduce coerciveness
in all other aspects of the encounter she can control. Thus, the doctrine would still incentivize good and
deter bad behavior. See infra Section IV.C.
146
See infra Sections IV.D–E.
147
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973).
148
Id. at 226 (emphasis added).
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Id. at 229.
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cases. It is a fair criticism to suggest that totality tests are, by design,
vulnerable to abuse by “unfettered discretion [in] the trial court” because a
“judge can emphasize or downplay any factor she wishes” when no
“particular factor [is given] controlling weight.”150 However, utter disregard
of race during the totality inquiry would be legal error, and the complete
omission of such a relevant and potentially significant consideration would
not be harmless in many cases. However, there is reason to worry that,
absent legislative action or clear Supreme Court guidance, appeals courts
might find the error harmless in some, if not many, cases.
American scholars and jurists have, rightfully, spent considerable ink
trying to parse the line between consent and coercion in the Fourth
Amendment context and elsewhere. The stakes are exceptionally high
because this distinction raises profound questions about free will, selfdetermination, and individual liberty, concepts foundational to the
American social and legal compact.151 Misidentifying coerced compliance
or cooperation as voluntary consent offends our commitment to free will as
a guiding jurisprudential principle152 and calls into question the legitimacy
of related state action. That is precisely what happens when judges
continue to walk through the Schneckloth totality inquiry while ignoring
race. Just as police officers can no longer reasonably deny knowledge of
widespread citizen distrust and apprehension in light of ubiquitous
coverage and discussion of alleged misconduct, judges no longer can plead
ignorance of the psychological impact on persons of color.
C.   Race Is Important Regardless of How Courts Frame the
Consent Inquiry
Regardless of whether a court conceives the consent to search inquiry
as a question of reasonableness or voluntariness, through the exclusive eyes
of an officer or borrowing aspects of the citizen’s perspective, race is both
relevant and important. First, consider the pure reasonableness conception.
Under this paradigm, the Fourth Amendment permits all consent searches
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where the officer reasonably believes that a citizen grants consent.153 We
reasonably assume that most, if not all officers, actually know about
widespread apprehension in communities of color around police violence,
and at the very least, courts will impute such knowledge to them because
such information is broadly and easily available. Given that knowledge, it
would be unreasonable for any such officer to ignore that knowledge and
believe that this apprehension did not affect her interactions with persons of
color, and in particular, did not make such persons feel (at least somewhat)
coerced into granting consent to search. Second, the consideration of this
factor under the more prevalent blended reasonableness and voluntariness
conception is even more straightforward. Under this paradigm, the consent
exception to the Fourth Amendment does not apply when a person
involuntarily granted consent to search. The pervasive awareness of police
misconduct creates a fundamentally coercive dynamic when a person of
color is asked to consent to search, calling into question the voluntariness
of any such consent. Assuming (as we can) that all police officers have
some awareness of this apprehension, they are put on notice that any
request of consent is affected, to a greater or lesser extent, by this coercive
dynamic.
To be clear, while courts have wrongfully ignored race in their
Schneckloth analysis, consideration of race would not require courts to
explicitly overturn prior case law. Mendenhall indicates that race has long
been a proper consideration, notwithstanding its short shrift in the years
since. Even if Drayton and Bostick were read as implicitly abrogating the
nod to race in Mendenhall, the ubiquitous social awareness of current
incidents of police misconduct against people of color and the unparalleled
amplifying effect of video footage offer an easy means of distinguishing
those cases. In other words, including race as a factor would not require
courts to admit error in decades of post-Schneckloth case law finding
consent of persons of color voluntary despite broad distrust of law
enforcement. While dubious, it is not as inconceivable that courts indeed
lacked knowledge of such sentiments or could have doubted that that police
officers knew or had reason to know that persons of color harbored
heightened apprehension. However, the current technology and media
landscape has rendered denials as to knowledge of such distrust and its
source implausible.
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IV.  ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Considering race in this manner raises both theoretical and practical
concerns, as do all the factors listed in Schneckloth and identified since.
Some of these are less worrisome than they first appear, but there are
certainly others that merit additional review. While this Note does not
explore in full detail all such important questions, the following discussion
provides a starting point for further analysis. To be sure, recent
developments in news and social media have created increasingly divergent
and contradictory constructed realities for segments of the American public
that call into question the wisdom of permitting communal sentiments to
drive legal doctrine. Similarly, framing the consent inquiry too much on
such sentiments could lead to absurd results if expanded beyond this
context, as unreasonable fears stemming from conspiracy theories could
shape Fourth Amendment law. This Part also discusses how consistent
consideration of race in consent search cases might change behavioral
incentives for police officers. Finally, it addresses arguments that merely
including race as one of many factors in a totality inquiry will be
inadequate to address systemic inequities.
A.   Media Trends
Recent events have highlighted the worrisome degree to which
Americans obtain news from sources that reinforce prior beliefs.154 In a
world of self-selected social networks, targeted and partisan news outlets,
and others exclusive feedback loops, it is not inconceivable that a story
pervading one segment of the population barely registers on the radar of
another. Many experts worry this problem is likely to worsen in the coming
years.155 For example, a reported incident of police violence could spread
like wildfire through communities of color around the country, but, in the
short term, law enforcement officers may know nothing about it. This is a
legitimate concern, but this problem is not unique to the consent–coercion
inquiry. As Professor Tokson notes, courts mostly ignore such nuance in
presuming societal knowledge when information is generally accessible,156
and there is no principled reason to treat this Fourth Amendment inquiry
differently. Under this prevailing conception of presumed knowledge for
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generally accessible information, it seems unlikely that an officer could
successfully rebut the presumption—her news sources, social media
community, and formal and experiential education would have put her on
notice of a recent incident of police misconduct and the history of distrust.
The only scenario in which this dynamic could prove troublesome would
be in the immediate aftermath of a high-profile incident. Even still, in such
a case, the question would be what additional weight race deserves in the
totality inquiry—i.e., whether any additional coercive effect caused by a
recent uptick in already heightened distrust is to be considered when it is
unclear if information about the incident was not yet generally accessible
when the consent search in question occurred.
To be sure, there are legitimate concerns about the increasingly
prevalent role of fake news,157 sensationalized reporting of real events, and
the degree to which widespread apprehensions originate from such
misleading narratives. Entirely fabricated or materially embellished
reporting of a violent incident may lead to a sincere increase in distrust, and
it may seem difficult, at first blush, to distinguish such a scenario from
instances of actual abuse. Yet, this wrinkle is less problematic than it
seems. In Bostick, the Court refused to consider the defendant’s knowledge
of his possession of contraband as an indication that he would not have
voluntarily consented to search.158 In so doing, the Court suggested that
certain sentiments, even if sincerely held, can be excluded from the totality
inquiry if they would produce absurd results. It would not be difficult for
courts to likewise employ their equitable discretion here.
Because there is no reasonable dispute as to the legitimacy and
intensity of the heightened distrust of police in communities of color
caused by their historical mistreatment, the only questions are what weight
should be given to race in the totality inquiry and to what degree that
weight should increase as a result of and in the aftermath of a recent highprofile incident. While judges should not be asked to determine the validity
or authenticity of possibly fake news, it should not be difficult to respect
the core rationale behind the relevance of race while preventing absurd
consequences.159
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B.   Reliance on Other Communal Sentiments
While pervasive distrust of law enforcement in communities of color
is an appropriate consideration in a consent to search analysis, there are
risks to incorporating other communal sentiments into the totality inquiry.
For instance, significant percentages of adults in the United States believe
that the following allegations about the government are “definitely” or
“probably true”: that the U.S. government helped plan the September 11,
2001 attacks (25%); that Barack Obama was born in Kenya (36%); that the
Hillary Clinton presidential campaign orchestrated child trafficking through
a pizza shop in Washington D.C. (38%); and that millions of illegal votes
were cast in the 2016 presidential election (46%).160 In addition, 48% of
U.S. adults believe in the existence of a “deep state,” which is a cabal of
“military, intelligence, and government officials who try to secretly
manipulate government policy.”161 Such beliefs likely correspond with a
generally heightened distrust of government, which may translate into
distrust of law enforcement.162 Following the logic of this Note, should
these pervasive sentiments not also be considered in the totality inquiry if a
person subscribing to them is challenging the validity of a consent search?
In other words, does considering race and affording it greater weight in the
aftermath of a high-profile incident of police misconduct compel courts to
likewise legitimate unfounded but pervasive beliefs? Permitting such
unfounded—though sincere—sentiments to shape Fourth Amendment law
would be dangerous. Fortunately, continuing to ignore these sentiments is
entirely consistent with consideration of racially correlated distrust.
The consent search doctrine already explicitly identifies an
individual’s prior experience with law enforcement as a relevant
consideration, though, in practice, certain courts have proven unwilling to
consider any aspects of the citizen–police encounter that were not readily
apparent to the officer. In such courts, the coercive effect of the distrust that
follows from fierce conspiratorial beliefs could only be considered if the
criminal procedure would materially impact coverage decisions, given the myriad considerations that
inform such decisions and the remote, uncertain, and minor “benefits” that changes in coverage would
yield even for the most partisan of outlets (i.e., a slight change in the probability of suppressing
evidence in the prosecution of unknown defendants at indefinite future dates).
160
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resulting distrust is sufficiently publicized such that it is considered general
knowledge and members of the community are readily identifiable. While
it is conceivable that such a community could exist, today’s disillusioned
and conspiratorial hardly represent a discrete and insular minority. Thus, it
would be appropriate to limit the consideration of communal sentiments to
the unique status of race, a distinction that has long served as a protected
class. This distinction alone justifies the limitation, as does the abundant
evidence that communities of color have experienced disproportionately
high rates of potentially coercive contacts with law enforcement.163
C.   Behavioral Incentives
While the validity of a consent search can arise as an issue in the civil
context (i.e., a Bivens action or § 1983 claim), the more common context
involves the exclusionary rule and a motion to suppress the evidence
obtained pursuant to the search.164 While it once may have had broader
justifications, the exclusionary rule has been largely limited to the
deterrence of undesirable police behavior.165 That is, if exclusion of certain
evidence would not deter the police from committing bad acts in the future,
then such evidence is admissible notwithstanding its unconstitutional
origin. While the question of constitutionality under the Fourth
Amendment and the application of the exclusionary rule are two distinct
inquiries, it is easy to see how the distinction disappears in a circumstance
such as this, where it is well-settled that involuntary consent requires
exclusion of subsequent evidence. In other words, the deterrence concern
that motivates the exclusionary rule very likely colors the Court’s
application of consent search doctrine to new factual scenarios.
Fortunately, meaningful consideration of race would seemingly have a
positive, though likely minor, behavioral impact on law enforcement.
Knowing that courts will explicitly consider the heightened distrust held in
communities of color when determining the voluntariness of consent,
police would have extra incentive to be respectful, calm, and unthreatening
163
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to extinguish the inherently coercive nature of their encounter and ensure
that as many of the other Schneckloth factors weigh in their favor. While it
is conceivable that consideration of race in this manner could “dampen the
ardor”166 with which officers seek consent to search, any changes in
behavior would likely be modest and salutary, ensuring their behavior
tracks more closely with “positive” factors (such as increased politeness,
affirmative disclosure of right to refuse consent, etc.). While some
encourage law enforcement to take full advantage of the power imbalance
inherent to these encounters,167 this slight behavioral change would be a
welcome correction in light of other excesses permitted by law and
occurring in practice. In other words, it seems unlikely that considering
race would risk losing many opportunities for voluntary consent. On the
other hand, others may find consistent consideration of race in the consentcoercion–inquiry inadequate to address the broad array of issues that
beseech citizen–police relations in communities of color.168 For example,
Professor Carbado suggests that social forces, police training and culture,
and qualified immunity doctrine explain much of “the persistence of . . .
‘blue-on-black violence.’”169 To be sure, the changes advocated in this Note
are no panacea, but rather immediately attainable adjustments that could
materially improve a flawed doctrine.
Setting aside the empirical question of whether consistent inclusion of
this factor would reduce the total number of consent searches (because it is
speculative) and the normative question of whether that reduction would be
a social good (because it is disputable), it seems quite likely that any
resulting changes in how police engage with people of color and request
their consent would be overwhelmingly positive: there would be stronger
incentives for respecting civil liberties and applying force more evenly
across all communities.
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D.   Questions of Line Drawing and Weight
Explicitly including race in the Schneckloth test would ensure courts
are accurately accounting for the totality of circumstances influencing the
voluntariness of consent, but important questions of line drawing and
weight would indeed remain. The flexibility of a totality test allows judges
to apply broad principles to specific fact patterns, but there is a risk that this
factor could be misapplied or functionally rendered meaningless without
clear guidelines for its application. For how long should a contemporary
incident trigger heightened weight for race? Need a contemporary incident
involve a person of color to trigger heightened weight? Do these rules
apply with equal force as applied to Hispanic communities as to black
communities? Does increased factual similarity between a request for
consent and a contemporary incident further increase the weight? What
degree of harm is necessary for an incident to trigger heightened weight?
Serious bodily injury? Death? Should the degree of harm incurred during
recent incidents affect the weight? While it is reasonable to presume
societal knowledge of historical mistreatment of communities of color by
police and ongoing citizen–police incidents today, given that we are merely
a generation or two removed from the height of the Jim Crow Era and
contemporary events receive blanket coverage, what happens if—let us
hope—such incidents grow increasingly rare in coming years and relations
between law enforcement and communities of color improve markedly?
While it seems quite unlikely we will reach a point in the foreseeable future
where race is irrelevant, given centuries of race-based systemic
oppression,170 how much less weight should race be given if relative distrust
is on the decline? These are important and difficult questions, and they
deserve much more attention than this Note can provide. Nonetheless, these
are minor compared to the threshold question of whether race should be
considered at all when evaluating the voluntariness of a consent search
today.
E.   Inherent Flaws of Totality Test
This Note can barely scratch the surface of these legitimate, complex
questions. And as noted, there are no clear guidelines for weighing any
factors under Schneckloth—a totality of the circumstances inquiry, by
design, lacks bright-line principles to predictably guide factor balancing,171
and instead empowers a judge to reach the most just outcome given the
170
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specific facts at hand.172 This is the commonly cited tradeoff between
standards and rules.173 Under a totality of the circumstances test, it is not
uncommon for judges to downplay the importance of certain factors in
adjudicating the cumulative effect of all relevant considerations.
Consequently, some might fear that judges would merely pay lip service to
race in the totality inquiry while affording it such little weight to render the
inclusion meaningless. Such critics may insist that inclusion of race as one
of many aspects of a test subject to significant judicial discretion is
insufficient to address these systemic sociocultural and legal concerns—
rather, they might contend, such uncertainties counsel in favor of creating a
presumption of coercion until and unless incidents of police violence (and
their sociocultural salience) disappear, or at the very least, in the immediate
aftermath of an incident that dominates mainstream news outlets. A
presumption would eliminate many line-drawing and weight problems and
provide bright lines within consent search doctrine. Law enforcement
already has the burden of proving consent free of coercion, so this
presumption would only represent a change in degree (not in kind) in the
burden of proof.
Others would surely argue that such a presumption would materially
impair the functioning of law enforcement by discouraging police-initiated
encounters and invalidating too many genuinely consensual searches that
lead to the discovery of contraband. Thus, this Note’s recommendation that
courts treat race as one, but exceptionally important, factor may serve as a
workable compromise. Consideration of race in the consent search inquiry
is hardly a panacea for structural racism and the resulting injustices, as
Fourth Amendment doctrine is littered with rules that encourage
discriminatory policing and rationalize its effects.174 Nonetheless, it is a step
in the right direction.
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CONCLUSION
In January 2017, the U.S. Department of Justice released a scathing
report on the Chicago Police Department, which found that “trust between
the CPD and the people it serves . . . has been broken, despite the diligent
efforts and brave actions of countless CPD officers . . . by systems that
allowed CPD officers who violate the law to escape accountability.”175 By
recognizing the psychological impact of historical and recent violence
committed by law enforcement against people of color, courts can vindicate
long-ignored constitutional violations, honor the deep-seated fears of
communities victimized for generations by private and state-sanctioned
violence, and encourage law enforcement to shift additional focus to
rebuilding trust in these communities. Such a change could very well
increase the rate of cooperation between police and the citizenry, allowing
law enforcement to better ferret out the crime targeted by their prior
coercive—and thus illegitimate—consent searches. Nothing prevents state
and federal judges from immediately breathing life into this meaningful
aspect of consent search jurisprudence identified by the Supreme Court in
1980 but ever since ignored.

175

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV. & U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE N.D. ILL.,
INVESTIGATION OF THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT 1 (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/
file/925846/download [https://perma.cc/Nz8R-KW9U].

566

